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abgehalten, und Menschen wie der bedauernswerte Adolf Muschg haben sich da mit Spe-
zialvorträgen abgeplagt: »Gibt es eine schweizerische Nationalliteratur?« Wirklich natio-
nal ist man auf dem Gebiet der Literatur mit der Gründung des Berufsverbandes der
Deutschlehrer geworden. Der Germanistenverband hat am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts
etwas sehr Unangenehmes erfunden, das in den anschließenden Jahrzehnten bösartige
Wirkungen gezeitigt hat. Das war die sogenannte ›Deutschkunde‹, ein ominöser Wort-
schwamm. ›Kunde‹ vom deutschen Wesen lässt sich auch mit literarischer Beihilfe betrei-
ben. Das hat uns zu schaffen gemacht, auch bei sehr ernsthaften Autoren, ich erinnere nur an
die Neuromantik und Hugo von Hofmannsthal mit seiner emphatischen Begrüßung von
Josef Nadlers Literaturgeschichte der deutschen Stämme und Landschaften, jedenfalls ihres
vierten Bandes, in dem eine spezifisch österreichische Literatur aufscheint. Diese Gespens-
ter der Vergangenheit treiben noch heute hie und da ihr Unwesen.
Nicholas Davey (Dundee)
Tradition and Identity: ›Aneignung‹ and ›Abgrenzung‹
Introduction
This conference invites us to think about the questions of musical culture, identity and
tradition. The literature attached to the conference speaks of an ›Aneignungs- und Abgren-
zungsprozess‹1, a process which by its very terminology poses certain thematic oppositions:
tradition (the continuity of a practice) v e r s u s history (the narrative of the changes and
crises within a practice), assimilation v e r s u s resistance, and identity v e r s u s fragmenta-
tion. Contemporary awareness of these oppositions in current cultural practice is a partial
consequence of the globalisation of music technology, transmission and transfer. Herme-
neutic philosophy shares with globalisation an acute awareness of the historical and cultural
specificities of cultural practices. If there is any universal acknowledgement in contemporary
critical practice it is, clearly, that loyalty to universal norms of composition and perform-
ance is no longer tenable. Nietzsche’s prophecy has become a commonplace. All founda-
tions appear to have dissolved. Nevertheless, as a philosopher concerned with aesthetic
and hermeneutic experience, I am suspicious of ›large questions‹ and ›big oppositions‹.
Nietzsche also once aptly remarked that everything apparently simple is in fact highly com-
plex. After all, reason is, as he and others have noticed, a gross and clumsy tool: it tends to
1 These are the key terms that were set by the organisers of our panel (Musik und kulturelle Identität.
Weimar, XIII. Internationaler Kongress der Gesellschaft für Musikforschung. 16. bis 21. September 2004, Pro-
gramm, Abstracts, Weimar 2004, S. 94). They do not refer here to any specific philosophical work.
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simplify, to speak in ›either /or‹ terms where as the sharper ear of experience hears grada-
tions rather than outright sameness and difference. Like identity and non-identity, mod-
ernism and tradition, these are all terms that are interdependent. Far from contradicting
or excluding each other, each depends on its correlative term to sustain its meaning. I wish
in this presentation to think about these terms a little more closely and want to suggest
that in relation to the dynamics of a creative practice, they are far for more interconnected
than commonly supposed.
I am not a music theorist but the themes which concern this conference are central
motifs in current hermeneutic and aesthetic debate. Hermeneutic philosophy is, of course,
primarily concerned with matters of experience, that is, with what a new work says to us
and with the preconditions that underwrite the possibility of such ›speaking‹. Furthermore,
questions relating to tradition, history, and what is referred to as an ›Aneignungs- und
Abgrenzungsprozess‹ are resonant with allusions to Gadamer’s notion of ›Wirkungsge-
schichte‹.2 The dynamics of this process have a critical implication for how we understand
the identity of a creative practice and it is this implication that I would like to explore. One
of the reasons debates about tradition and identity have become so urgent is not so much
because of the arguments of deconstruction or postmodernism but because of the empirical
fact of globalisation. It is on globalisation and its impact of musical practices that I will make
my first remarks.
I. Globalisation: a New Music or ›Musicks‹ Renewed
The modernist tendency in both music and art shares with the globalisation of commerce
and communication an aspiration to universality, a universality which frees expression and
exchange from the particular limitations of history and geographical location. »Globali-
sation has done to music what photography did to painting«.3 Just as photography liberated
the painted image from specific geo-cultural locations, so digital recording and communi-
cation has freed music performance from the limitations of social and cultural placement.
At the flick of switch, a music event can be recorded, despatched in seconds to the other
side of the globe, be reassembled, re-edited and reconfigured in an altogether different
context. The resultant expansion of a shareable sound world has been extraordinary. The
phenomenal success in Great Britain of BBC’s Late Junction programme indicates that the
CD collections of informed music listeners now embrace with equal love and enthusiasm
Berio, Argentinian Tango, Sufi religious music, Josquin, Beethoven and Messiaen. For some
traditionalists this speaks of the collapse of cultural integrity. The integrity of the modernist
aspiration towards a progressive universal musical language has been compromised. Europe’s
musical sensitivities are now as eclectic as its culinary appetites.
The globalisation of musical transmission and transfer has clear advantages. The ›univer-
salisation‹ of availability has encouraged an increased awareness of the historical specificity
2 Please refer to the chapter »Analyse des wirkungsgeschichtlichen Bewußtseins« in: Hans Georg
Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen 61990, p. 346–384.
3 See John Berger, Ways of Seeing, London 1996, p. 44.
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and cultural differences that distinguish one musical tradition from another. This has (right-
ly) undermined a once dangerously persuasive ideological prejudice that only the modernist
European musical tradition (i. e. the second Viennese school) was progressive and had any
merit. Interest in earlier forms of music was condemned as unprogressive, reactionary or
conservative precisely because of their identifiable specificity. This unthinking modernist
prejudice tried to force all musical forms into a singular universal discourse. This is a preju-
dice well rid of. It is, after all, a gross arrogance to assume that progression and innovation
are possible only within the modernist genre. Thankfully we now listen to Perotinus or
Victoria with different and, indeed, enriched ears capable of appreciating both that ingenuity,
invention and creativity manifest themselves in all traditions and are not to be sequestered
by any one. Globalisation, then, can have an enlightening effect. It can expose the particu-
lar prejudices hidden within the universal pretensions of our dominant cultural traditions.
However, the globalisation of music transmission has a darker side.
Globalisation may unify a mode of musical transmission but it also fragments, disrupts,
and displaces musical traditions. An increased awareness of the real differences between
musical traditions, performance conventions and aesthetic form undermines belief in the
credibility of any universal norm of practice and evaluation. This can undermine the ›cer-
tainty‹ or confidence that sustains creative conviction. As Anthony Giddens observes, the
declining authority of a dominant cultural practice engenders a degree of uncertainty that
tends to leave the individual practitioner, steering a troubled course between personal com-
mitment and uncertainty.4 All creative practice requires to a certain degree an acceptance
of and trust in the norms and expectancies of the tradition within which a composer works.
However, philosophically speaking, there is an instructive paradox here. C r e a t i v i t y may
r e qu i r e a s one o f i t s p r e c ond i t i o n s a c e r t a i n s t ab i l i t y i n t h e no rm s o f
i t s p r a c t i c e b u t i t e q u a l l y d em a nd s t h a t s u c h no rm s a r e t o a c e r t a i n
e x t e n t q u e s t i o n e d , p r ob e d a nd c h a l l e n g e d . No creative practice can stay still
and remain creative. The v i t a l i t y o f a c r e a t i v e p r a c t i c e r e s i d e s i n i t b e i n g a
p r o c e s s o f c o n t r o l l e d i n s t a b i l i t y. What globalisation undermines is confidence
in the transferability or the universal expansion of the creative values which underwrite a
single practice or tradition. Europe has perhaps only fairly recently come to accept that its
modernist tradition of creative practice is no longer universally appropriate or privileged.
There are two issues here which should not be confused.
First: globalisation may have exposed the ideological (global) pretensions of European
modernism but, in doing so, it has also revealed a global truth about creative traditions.
Though the advent of globalisation shows that modernism has had its day, it also reveals that
a l l t r a d i t i o n s a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y mode r n i s t i n s p i r i t o r h a v e t o b e c ome
s o i n o rd e r t o s u r v i v e . As we have argued, all creative traditions worthy of the name
must face the challenge of difference and otherness. Globalisation spells the end of isola-
tionism and cultural protectionism: no practice-tradition can stand on its own anymore,
no form of cultural identity is immune from the challenge of the other and the different.
However, globalisation has in this respect only made universally apparent what was re-
4 AnthonyGiddens,Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the LateModern Age, London 41995, p. 201.
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gionally speaking almost certainly already the case. Globalisation certainly undermines
faith in any universal set of creative norms and as a consequence it demands of practices
committed to such a faith that they confront the challenge posed by the emergence of the
›other‹. The challenged practice has to respond in terms of ›Aneignung‹ or ›Abgrenzung‹.
Globalisation reveals that the challenge which the ›Aneignungs-Prozess‹ poses individual
traditions is neither a regional nor a new challenge but a shared condition characteristic
of all vital traditions.
Second: precisely because no creative practice can remain still, no vital practice will
remain unfriendly to or uncurious about other traditions. Was it not Nietzsche who ob-
served that no artist will ignore the language of ›good effects‹? To think of a cultural prac-
tice as having to absorb, assimilate, and appropriate the other and the different as its own
or as having to resist the other to protect its creative integrity is to think of practices as
›subjects‹ or ›agencies‹ rather than as processes. It is to accord them with the status of
identities that maintain themselves either by assimilating the other as its own or by wilfully
denying the other. However, creative practices are not egos or subjects which define their
identity in Sartrean fashion, that is by dominating or negating the other. As we have sug-
gested, a creative practice is always in a state of controlled instability and must remain so
in order to maintain the continuity of its narrative. A v i t a l p r a c t i c e w i l l s e e k ou t
t h e o t he r p r e c i s e l y t o c h a l l e n g e i t s ow n s upp o s i t i o n s f o r i t i s on l y i n
r i s k i n g i t s e l f i n eng ag ement w i t h t he o t he r t h a t a p r a c t i c e c a n d i s c e r n
a s e n s e o f wh a t i t m i gh t y e t b e c ap ab l e o f i n t e rm s o f new e x p r e s s i o n .
In this context philosophical hermeneutics is instructive.
II. On the Question of Practices and their Identity
It is a mistake to think of cultural practices and traditions as fixed, stable identities with
an essential core. Traditions are unquestionably continuities of practice but, as MacIntyre
points out, the continuities within such practices are invariably continuities of conflict,
continuing debates about how the fundamental questions of a practice are best answered.5
Traditions are better thought of pace? Benjamin and Adorno, as constellar structures,
fluid configurations of approach to canonic questions for as Gadamer reminds us traditions
are constituted not by works but by the questions which works address. Traditions and/or
creative practices are not fixed identities or closed fields of operation. They each address
a set of subject-matters or concerns be they to do with expression, form, or rigour. Such
subject matters are like grounding concepts. None are fully determinate and so each tran-
scends every historical explication of them. In other words, such subject matters or what
Gadamer refers to as ›Sachen‹ are entities about which a great deal has been unsaid and a
great deal has yet to be said. A given practice may in the past have approached a certain
subject-matter in a determinate way but, in so doing, it opens other as yet untried possibili-
ties of interpretation. This has a consequence for whether a tradition or practice is to be
considered as a fixed identity or not.
5 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, London 1993. p. 222.
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If we accept that the subject-matters of a tradition are conceptually speaking always of
a greater potential conceptual determinacy than any one interpretation permits, then, a
practice will always be more than its constituent interpretations will allow. Because of this
excess, practices are not identical with their constituent interpretations. Furthermore, the
pursuits of any practice will invariably of itself challenge how that practice understands its
nature. Practices like traditions maintain themselves by translation and transmission. Yet
transmission is inevitably selective or interpretative. The way a practice receives a subject-
matter and applies it in its own context, always creates an uneasy and ineliminable differ-
ence between what a practice thinks of itself as being and what it can potentially become. It
is this ineliminable difference which, as Iser argues, drives a practice towards every new
interpretations of itself.6 The quest for identity generates a non-identity which, in its turn,
further stimulates the desire for identity. As we shall now argue, this element of difference
or non-identity is precisely the point that makes a practice susceptible to the influence of
the strange and the foreign. However, our principal point re-enforces the argument that
creative traditions are controlled processes of instability. It also confirms our argument
that all creative practices are in a state of crisis for the very interpretative procedures that
maintain their being, also disrupt the understanding of constituent subject-matters.
The historical continuity of a practice does not lie in repeatedly performing the same
thing but, rather, it unfolds from within its own dialogue with itself, some of its different
potentials and possibilities. Each historical period allows a tradition to become more and in
becoming more, to become different to itself. Thus, although the parameters of a practice
or tradition may be culturally and historically specific, that specificity does not foreclose
the creative potentialities within it. How that potentiality unfolds will very much depend
upon the external influences brought to bear on the tradition. This explains why vital tradi-
tions must, in effect, seek out or risk the other, the strange and the foreign. If traditions
are open in the sense that what they might become – their unrealised potential – has not
yet been fully determined, a l l t r a d i t i o n s r em a i n i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e u n k now n
t o t h em s e l v e s . What a tradition can yet be capable of will only become apparent when
it enters into dialogue with other practices. Precisely, because no creative practice can stay
still and remain creative, a vibrant practice needs engagement with the other precisely in
order to place its norms at risks, to change how it thinks of itself and to discover what it
is yet capable of. This process is essentially dialogical. It is not what Nietzsche described
as protoplasmic interpretation in which a practice or tradition »makes what it appropriates
equal to itself and fits it into its own forms and files«.7 Such an imperious process risks
nothing. It is not essentially creative. The norms of the assimilating practice are not risked
or questioned. Neither has ›Aneignung‹ to do with reductive explanations in the way that
Adorno discusses them.
Erklären involviert, gewollt oder ungewollt, auch ein Zurückführen des Neuen und
Unbekannten auf Bekanntes, wenngleich das Beste an den Werken dagegen sich
6 Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation, New York 2000.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, transl. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale, London
1968, section 276. Translated from the Nietzsche Musarionausgabe.
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sträubt. Ohne solche Reduktion, die an den Kunstwerken frevelt, könnten sie nicht
fortleben. Ihr Wesentliches, das Unerfaßte, ist auf identifizierende Akte, auf Erfas-
sen angewiesen; es wird dadurch zu einem Alten und Bekannten verfälscht.8
The process of ›Aneignung‹ has, arguably, more in common with Gadamer’s notion of
›Horizontverschmelzung‹9. The encounter with the other practice or tradition does not in-
volve a naïve assimilation but an interaction in which the meaning and the norms of each
are brought into the open. As a result of the exchange, both parties understand themselves
differently. Engagement with the other, enables a practice to risk and test its prejudices. The
argument is, then, that precisely because practices are in a certain sense unknown to them-
selves – i. e. their creative potential is historically speaking never fully determined – they
require ›engagement‹ with the other precisely in order to test and extend their expectan-
cies. What a practice can become thus depends upon the quality of its relations with other
practices. What globalisation does is to make engagement with the other inevitable. There
are two other features of ›Aneignung‹ worthy of note.
Firstly, ›Aneignung‹ is not the opposite of ›Abgrenzung‹ but entails an element of ›Ab-
grenzung‹ within itself. ›Aneignung‹ implies a process of adaption and application. For two
practices to influence one another they must be spatially and temporally contiguous. Fur-
thermore, the two practices must be capable of entering a form of dialogical relationship
in that each allows the other to see a shared concern or subject-matter in a new light. Not
only must each party be contiguous but what each offers the other must be continuous with
its primary concerns, that is, a practice must be able to apply what it gains from the other.
These points suggest, secondly, that when a practice achieves a new determination of its
creative possibilities in its engagement with an other, it forecloses certain possible deter-
minations of itself. Having achieved a certain adaptation of its possibilities, prevents it from
adopting others. Thus a practice will or will not be open or susceptible to certain other
influences due to the fatality of its history of interactions. ›Abgrenzung‹ is necessarily a con-
sequence of ›Aneignung‹. These remarks bring us to a point where we can begin to reflect
upon the problem of the new. Let me preface my remarks as follows.
III. On the Question of the New
If interaction between practices supposes both a contiguity of relation and a continuity of
concern, the new emerges not as something in its own right but as a mode of relation between
practices. Hermeneutically speaking, the notion of the new seems paradoxical. The pheno-
menology of the new is of course endearingly powerful in most communities. New births,
new beginnings, re-newel, are all celebrated for their evocation of promise, excitement,
freshness and movement. The new is always youthful because it is enlivening. Yet, in con-
trast, to this if perception and knowledge depend upon a background of the already-known,
8 Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 7: Ästhetische Theorie, ed. by Gretel Adorno and Rolf
Tiedemann, Frankfurt a.M. 1997, p. 521.
9 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 289f, p. 356f.
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for something to recognise as ›new‹ is to admit that on a certain level, it is not new at all. To
acknowledge a form or a practice as new is to say that we recognise something already known
but in a new or novel guise. The ›new‹ is not known in the sense of being something ab-
solutely original but as a hitherto unexpected variation of an established theme. Adorno
observes that »das Verhältnis zum Neuen […] sein Modell an dem Kind [hat], das auf dem
Klavier nach einem noch nie gehörten, unberührten Akkord tastet. Aber es gab den Akkord
immer schon, die Möglichkeiten der Kombination sind beschränkt, eigentlich steckt schon
alles in der Klaviatur.«10 If something is radically new in that its like has not been seen
before, there is some doubt that it will be recognised as ›new‹. In other words, what ever
emerges as new must already be in part conceptually determinable. This raises to questions
to which we will return but it must also prompt questions about the difficulties cultural
globalisation supposedly poses.
The globalisation of communication frees music traditions from their geographic and
cultural specificity. It has created a virtual contiguity in which no tradition or practice can
remain isolated. On one level, this cannot but be a positive development. If all creative prac-
tices need ›risk‹ and ›questioning‹ to remain vital and if creative traditions are, in the sense
discussed, unknown to themselves, the possibilities of enhanced engagement with the other
and the different is to be welcomed. On the other hand, the sudden multiplication of new
voices which globalisation affords can be judged a threat to traditional practices. The pleth-
ora of possibilities is such that bewilderment and uncertainty undermine creative confi-
dence. Now, it can be argued, here, that the ability of globalisation to disrupt and fragment
creative practices is much over estimated. Philosophical hermeneutics suggests a reason
why this should be so.
To speak of new departures or new voices within a practice is to make a historical judge-
ment. It is to note that the tradition has changed or is changing. As a result of new emer-
gences, it is not what it was before. This suggests that a process of review and assimilation
has taken place so that the tradition can no longer be thought of as it was previously. This
endorses the view that a practice is not by any means an identity but a continuity of conflicts
which has been decisively mediated by an engagement with the different and the other.
The new cannot, therefore, be thought of as something in its own right, as something alien
or utterly unique but as a change of condition or direction within a practice. Thus, the new
denotes the continuity of change and tension within a tradition. The implications of this
argument are as follows.
If the new is a mode of relation, if the new is an interpretative consequence of encoun-
ters between different practices, then a distinction can be drawn between the novel, exotic
and ephemeral and the transformatively new on the other. This suggests a distinction com-
parable Gadamer’s differentiation between (1) momentary aesthetic sensationalism and
(2) the continuities of aesthetically apprehended meaning. To think that the experience of
the new is equivalent to the immediacy of the ›instantaneous flash of genius‹ is to treat the
new as a passing distraction or diversion. If the new is conceived in this sensationalist fash-
ion it does indeed possess the power of fragmentation. If the new becomes no more than a
10 Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 55.
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multiplicity of individual experiences, the new is utterly fragmentary and annihilates the
continuity of aesthetic experience. We become absorbed in the presence of momentary
aesthetic impressions.11 However, such decadent self-absorption distracts us from and lacks
any point of engagement with our indigenous practices. Understood in this way, the ›new‹
seems an escapist distraction. On the other hand, for substantive change to take place with-
in a practice, there has to be genuine exchange with another. As Gadamer remarks, »alles
Sichverstehen vollzieht sich aber an etwas anderem, das da verstanden wird, und schließt die
Einheit und Selbigkeit dieses anderen ein.«12 Moment s o f t r a n s f o rm a t i v e new ne s s
a r e momen t ou s r a t h e r t h a n momen t a r y. They are a result of an engagement
with another practice or tradition that has, in consequence, become decisively different
to itself. Now, as we have argued, this is possible only because a practice is open to other
influences because much of its own nature is unknown to itself. It requires engagement
with another practice in order to acquire a sense of its inherent possibilities. A number of
points follow from this.
The globalisation of music communication is not in itself a dangerous or negative phe-
nomenon. The proliferation of other horizons is not in itself a threat. Creative traditions will
only affect one another directly, if and only if there are points of mutual interest. Dialogue
between practices requires not just spatial and temporal contiguity but analogous align-
ments of individual concern. Exchange and transformation between practices presupposes
that in outlook, style, or concern each practice offers itself to the other as an opportunity for
self-reflection and exploration. One p r a c t i c e w i l l h a v e a n imp a c t o n a no t h e r
on l y i f i t c on t r i bu t e s t o i s s u e s , d i f f i c u l t i e s a nd deb a t e s wh i c h a r e p a r t
o f t h e c on t i nu i t y o r n a r r a t i v e o f t h e i n f l u e n c e d p r a c t i c e . Sometimes,
a practice can be most receptive to the influence of another precisely at those vulnerable
moments when its own creative resources fail. Of course, dialogue and exchange pose risks.
They demand that practices in order to remain creative become different to themselves. In
effect, the threat posed by globalisation to a cultural practice is no more and no less dan-
gerous than having to face the risks and challenges which are necessarily inherent to its re-
maining creative. Newness per se is not the threat or problem. The ›new‹, as we have argued,
is a relation, a transformative relation in which a practice becomes different to itself as a
consequence of an exchange with another.
Yet do our remarks and their hermeneutic orientation marginalise the importance of the
new? If one practice can transform another only at points where the internal debates or
tensions within a tradition’s unfolding continuity are vulnerable or susceptible to the other,
it might be said that, logically speaking, such changes were inherently possible within the
tradition. As was remarked above, if perception and knowledge depend upon a background
of the already-known for something to recognised as ›new‹, this is to admit that perhaps the
new on a certain level, is not new at all. To acknowledge a form or a practice as ›new‹ is to
say that we recognise something already known but in a new or novel guise. The ›new‹ is
here grasped not in the sense of being an original emergence but as an original variation
11 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 101.
12 Ibid., p. 102.
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of an established theme. In other words, what emerges as new must already be, in part,
conceptually determinable. Where in, then, lies the shock of the new? The answer lies, in
fact, in the very hermeneutic claim that appears to diminish the status of the new, namely,
that for something to be recognised as ›new‹, requires that it be in part conceptually de-
terminable.
To say that the new is in part conceptually determinable is also to say that the new is
not fully conceptually determinable and that it does not fit comfortably into the schemas
of the known. Without this element of conceptual indeterminacy, the new would lose its
allure, its promise and, indeed, its threat. It is this element of conceptually indeterminacy
within the new that needs discussion. Central to the argument has been the suggestion that
any vital practice remains creative so long as it continues to question the norms that under-
pin it. Confronting the challenge of the new is integral to the rejuvenation of any cultural
practice. This confrontation can be understood as a process of questioning and answering
which is both dialogical and dialectical. To expand this suggestion, let me draw a parallel
between Kant’s concept of genius and that side of the new which relates to the conceptually
indeterminate.
In the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant argues that »eine jede Kunst setzt Regeln voraus,
durch deren Grundlegung allererst ein Produkt, wenn es künstlich heißen soll, als möglich
vorgestellt wird.«13 Thus, by analogy, every new development within a practice must con-
form to some known rules or expectancies if it is to be recognised as ›new‹. However, Kant
also argues that the art work is not produced by the imitation of rules. »Also kann die
schöne Kunst sich nicht selbst die Regel ausdenken, nach der sie ihre Produkte zu Stande
bringen soll.« »Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt«,14 for
genius produces that which though rule like no rule can be given.15 To pursue the analogy,
the new in order to be new must in part possess features that are not reducible to the known
and the familiar. If as Kant argues, genius and the spirit of imitation are completely op-
posed, it follows that newness must in part challenge, question, be an affront to or resist
what is known.16 In this respect, Adorno is right to comment that »die Abstraktheit des
Neuen ist notwendig, man kennt es so wenig wie das furchtbarste Geheimnis von Poes
Grube.«17 The new must therefore involve a degree of conceptual indeterminacy. As we ar-
gued, the new is essentially to be grasped as a relation. Thus, the emergence of the new in
relation to an established practice represents an emergency. The norms and the expectancies
of the challenged practice are thrown into disarray. However, it is precisely, the creation of
an emergency and the need to respond to it that is the point. Newness is not a sudden rude-
ness, an affront or terrorist gesture for these only serve to strengthen the assumptions of
a tradition. The challenge of the partial conceptual indeterminacy which constitutes the
13 Immanuel Kant Werke in zehn Bänden, vol. 8: Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel,
Darmstadt 1983, p. 406 (A 179, B 181).
14 Ibid., p. 405 (A 178, B 181).
15 Ibid., p. 496 (A 179, B 181–182).
16 »Darin ist jedermann einig, daß Genie dem Nachahmungsgeiste gänzlich entgegen zu setzen sei.«
Ibid., p. 407 (A 181, B 183).
17 Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 37.
Davey: Tradition and Identity – ›Aneigung‹ and ›Abgrenzung‹
Roundtable II: Tradition versus Geschichte – Abgrenzung und Aneignung122
new is precisely that it creates an aesthetic ›distanciation‹ that allows a deliberate and de-
tached reflection of a dominant practice through the perspective of the new and an equally
detached exploration of the new in terms of the established practice. What I mean by aes-
thetic ›distanciation‹ is in part related to Gadamer’s account of the negativity of experience.
»Jede Erfahrung, die diesen Namen verdient«, he argues, »durchkreuzt eine Erwartung.«18
In der Tat ist […] Erfahrung zunächst immer Erfahrung der Nichtigkeit. Es ist
nicht so, wie wir annehmen. Angesichts der Erfahrung, die man an einem anderen
Gegenstand macht, ändert sich beides, unser Wissen und sein Gegenstand. Man
weiß es anders und besser […]. Der neue Gegenstand enthält die Wahrheit über
den alten.19
The new reveals a latent possibility within an established practice that had not been seen
before. We gain a better knowledge of what we thought we knew before but evidently did
not. This implies an aesthetic distanciation. The new entails a dual element of conceptual
determinacy – i. e. it is recognisable as making a claim about or is addressing a known prac-
tice and set of expectancies. However, the new also contains an element of conceptual in-
determinacy – i. e. we know it has something to do with a given practice but we are unsure
what. Hence, though exciting, the new is also unnerving, problematic, dis c o n c e r t ing.
In other words, the experience of the new necessarily sets us at a distance from what we
are familiar with, to see it from another perspective and perhaps to see in it, what we did
not see or hear before. The new creates an aesthetic detachment that allows us to see in
our familiar perspective what we had not seen before. It renders us strange to ourselves
and opens us towards the previously withheld potentialities within our practice. Aesthetic
distanciation affords a dialogical engagement with the traditional and the new. Both inter-
rogate each other. Whether the new is genuinely new – whether it has something to say –
depends upon whether over time it allows us to knowmore of a practice than we are presently
familiar. Equally, what is of genuine worth within a practice – what is capable of responding
to change and transforming itself – will be found out by the new. Either way, as with music
itself, only time will tell.
In summary, the unresolved tensions within a tradition or practice, give it a dynamic
which pushes it towards or make it susceptible to the new. In this respect, Adorno aptly re-
marks: »Seine Zuflucht hat das Alte allein an der Spitze des Neuen.«20 The new challenges
the old but not in the simple sense of being opposed to it. The confrontation between the
old and the new is needed by the old precisely in order to actualise the unrealised possi-
bilities within itself.21 Nietzsche once remarked that we cannot understand an entity that
does not have a history. A practice that had no internal conflicts or challenges would be a
practice without history. It would endlessly repeat itself. What gives a practice or tradition
18 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 362.
19 Ibid., p. 360.
20 Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 40.
21 Ibid., p. 40.
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its history (or, indeed, its histories) is precisely its encounters with the strange, the foreign
and the new. In other words, the ›continuity‹ of a practice (the history of its transforma-
tions) is provided by the negating power of the new and not by the repetition of the old.
Thus, the differential of the new is the proper location of productivity22 for it is the new
which prompts a practice to realise the latent possibilities within itself.
Dörte Schmidt (Stuttgart)
Mnemosyne. Funktionen der Erinnerung
in der Musik nach 1950
Bemerkungen zu Henri Pousseur, Helmut Lachenmann und Hans Zender
Die Brisanz der Debatte über ›Erinnerung‹, die die Geisteswissenschaften seit geraumer
Zeit beschäftigt, hängt eng zusammen mit der Frage, wie wir es in Zeiten der Kulturwissen-
schaften (denen wir die Debatte über kulturelle Identitäten verdanken) mit der Geschichte
halten. Die Musikwissenschaft hat das Phänomen der ›Erinnerung‹ allerdings noch kaum
thematisiert1 – und das, obwohl die Komponisten schon länger darüber nachdenken und
auch schreiben. Der Diskussion über »Tradition versus Geschichte«, die uns der Titel dieses
Roundtables als Aufgabe stellt, eine über die ›Erinnerung‹ hinzuzufügen und damit die
darin liegende Polarisierung in ein neues Licht zu rücken, ist das Anliegen der folgenden
Bemerkungen.
Beginnen möchte ich mit Bemerkungen Henri Pousseurs über sein Mnemosyne-Projekt,
nicht nur, weil er den Roundtable eröffnet hat und sich so zwanglos ein thematischer
Bogen schlagen lässt, sondern auch weil hier der Rahmen ausgeschritten wird, den ich
mir gesteckt habe:
Seit Beginn der sechziger Jahre (anders gesagt: seit d em Augenblick, wo ich mich in
den – in meinen Augen damals noch ziemlich riskanten – Versuch gestürzt hatte, das
hinter mir zu lassen, was ich die »beschränkte Serialität« genannt habe, ohne jedoch
in eine rein retrospektive Haltung zu verfallen, in die Aufgabe oder gar den Verrat
dessen, was das Serielle – und vor allem Webern – uns an äußerst Wertvollem gege-
ben hat), hatte der Traum in meinem Geist Gestalt angenommen, eine groß dimen-
sionierte Komposition zu entwerfen – möglicherweise eine Art von komplexer Kan-
22 Ibid., p. 405.
1 Als ersten größeren Anstoß zur Diskussion kann die im November 2001 in Paris veranstaltete Tagung
»Musique et mémoire« gelten [Kongressbericht: Musique et mémoire (= Collection Arts 8), Paris 2003].
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